Wednesday, March 6, 2013

Talking to the Hand


Talking to the Hand


Mr Rahul Bajaj, chairman of the Bajaj Group and a former parliamentarian has a penchant for not holding back his punches.  At a public forum (and in the presence of a Union Minister) at the World Economic Forum in Nov 2012, he not only accused the government of policy paralysis and weak governance but is also reported to have said: ""We decided many years ago, decades ago, that we will not do business where we have to deal with the government. We don't manufacture, we don't buy things for the government... We are in motorcycles, the financial services... We do not want to have anything to do with their bidding process".

He seems to have said openly what many in the Indian business say in private.

As per basic Economic theory, in a free market economic system, resources are allocated through the spending decisions of consumers combined with the supply decisions of producers. When demand is high, the potential profit from supplying to a market rises, leading to an expansion in supply to meet the rising demand and vice versa.  Adam Smith conceived the existence of an invisible hand of the market as a metaphor to describe this self-regulating behavior of the marketplace.

But very often, it is almost as if the invisible hand of the market forces is made to talk to the Government’s visible hand.

Government as the saver-spoiler

Per its mandate, the Government can always intervene whenever it feels that it needs to protect the Consumer or Businesses from the free Market forces. 

QE, stimulus measures, TARP, trade restrictions, pricing restrictions (e.g. Indian Pharma), Forex interventions – there are several forms in which the Governments world-wide force their hand.  Much as we love to loathe the government interference, one has to admit that the Government does have a fiduciary responsibility to intervene when things go out of hand.  Whether they are effective or not (or more devastating than useful) is another matter altogether.

But one aspect of the discussion is whether Government intervention is a nice to have on a more generic basis…you know.. like on a Macro basis.  And entirely another whether we as investors should have anything to do with companies that have negative exposure to Governmental intervention. 
One specific company that I have in mind for the discussion is Indraprastha Gas Limited (IGL).

Before the Regulatory storm hit IGL, it was considered in the value investing circles as a Buffett stock.  It had a ready market: a monopoly over supply of CNG (later also PNG) in Delhi and much of NCR, combined with the statutory requirement that all public transport buses, auto, taxis etc. need to ply on CNG (which as a fuel, has a pricing advantage over Petrol).  And it had pricing power: it had demonstrated an ability to pass on any increase in its Gas procurement cost to the Consumer (unlike the downstream oil companies who, being under Government control, could not raise prices of fuel without first checking with the Government).  Good growth, great returns, good management, negative working capital… the works.

Then, in April 2012, PNGRB, the Government appointed body for Petroleum and Natural gas, gave an order that shook up not only IGL, but the entire City Gas Distribution (CGD) industry.  PNGRB mandated that IGL had to cut its tariff by ~ 63% (on a retrospective basis from 2008!) and return the excess collected by it back to the consumers.  In effect, this would have meant a serious challenge to the networth of the company while eroding its operating margin completely.  This is what happened to the IGL stock.




An over 50% fall in a matter of hours.

IGL duly took the case to the Delhi High Court and won it in June 2012, upon which, the PNGRB took this up with the Supreme Court of India (SC), which is where the case presently is.  The next date for hearing is listed for April 4th 2013.  Issue 1.

To complicate matters further, there has been a simmering dispute inter-se the Government, PNGRB and gas distribution companies on something called a marketing margin which is a part of the final cost charged by the Gas distribution companies (including GAIL, RIL as well as the CGDs).  The Government and PNGRB desired transparency and uniformity in the charge and the latter needed to have the freedom to control it depending on their requirements and circumstances.  There is no final word on this.  Yet.  So this is the 2nd Damocles sword hanging over IGL’s head, so to speak.

Mind you that the marketing margin is a fairly critical element because technically, even if the Supreme Court case was to go against IGL, they could hike the marketing margin to safeguard their margins.

And as if these 2 issues weren’t enough, another recent complication is the APM gas allocation.  The price of natural gas produced by National Oil Companies, namely, Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (ONGC) and OIL India Ltd. (OIL), is sold at Administered Price Mechanism (APM) price – which is lower than market price – for the purpose of usage in high priority industries such as power, fertilizer, CGD etc.  This price was last revised in 2010 when it was doubled from $1.9 per million metric British thermal unit (mmbtu) to $4.2mmbtu.

Unfortunately, the low prices of gas under APM have had the effect of discouraging these companies from making investment in further exploration.  Helped by this realization and doubtlessly some energetic lobbying by Reliance Industries (they also want a revision), there are moves afoot to double the price of APM gas to $8-8.5mmbtu sometime this calendar year.  It has been reported that the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas has forwarded the note to the Cabinet citing the Rangarajan Committee’s suggestions along similar lines.

No doubt that such an action’s larger implications on matters such as inflation – that too in an election year, will be discussed seriously at the Cabinet.  But the Government seems to be eager to show that it can take bold policy actions.  And this matter has assumed an urgency since this was obliquely mentioned by the FM in the recent Budget speech.

So there you go..  An example where Governmental action – if and when it happens on the APM pricing – is clearly good for the long term benefit of having prices that are market driven and not artificially created (the new rate of $8mmbtu is closer to market price than $4.2).  And certainly there are winners, viz., the Gas producers who were till recently at the wrong end of the stick.  But there are losers too (all users of APM gas, viz., gas based power, fertilizer and CGD companies – and by extension, all consumers of the final product, be it power, fertilizer or CNG/ PNG – as most certainly, the producers will need to pass on the cost).

Back to the implications of all of these items on IGL.

So we have discussed 3 uncertainties on the company’s future: a) the dispute with PNGRB (currently at SC) b) the dispute of the marketing margin and c) pricing of the APM gas.  All having the imprint of the Government hand on them.

As regards the SC case, I understand that there is a lot of rumor mongering in the market regarding the final verdict – most of which suggests that the verdict will happen soon and IGL will win hands down.  How that has emerged, I have no idea since the company officials themselves privately and otherwise show no such bravado.  And they are in touch with the legal proceedings.

As regards the other 2 items of uncertainty, there is no saying when the Government is going to move (or not) on them.  Suffice it is to say that there are larger forces at play on such decision making.

However, negative or positive outcomes of each of these issues could move the stock substantially and hence I submit that these are not low risk/ high uncertainty outcomes where the profit could be large.  On the other hand, these are high risk/ high uncertainty outcomes where one needs to be very careful.

I would thus ascribe probabilities on each of these outcomes and a value to the stock on each such consequence.  Here is what I have done:




You can work on more situations and ascribe different probabilities or values to it.  But either way, my decision would be to look for an exit to the company as evidently the probabilistic workings (above) based on currently available facts, don’t show a material upside to the current price.

Sad end to a favorite holding but with too many uncertainties – each with large negative implications, I would rather leave something on the table for someone else who is willing to assume that risk.

Once again Mr. Bajaj – I have to agree with you.  I don’t like talking to the Government hand either..